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1ABSTRACT
There are currently two systems in the United States to ensure the safety of pharmaceutical products: tort
and regulation. The shared goal of tort law and Food and Drug Administrative (\FDA") regulation is to
make benecial drugs available to patients while keeping unsafe drugs o the market. This goal will be better
served if the two are combined into a unied system, wherein each functions in the role best suited to its
relative strengths and weaknesses. In the proposed unied system FDA would be the decision maker, setting
the standard for drug safety, and tort would be the enforcer, safeguarding the process of FDA regulation.
FDA is the better institution for making scientic decisions on a society-wide basis. Tort is the better
institution for ensuring FDA has all available information about a drug's safety and for restraining undue
political inuence over FDA decision-making. Tort should therefore hold pharmaceutical manufacturers
liable if they withhold safety information from FDA or if they attempt to force a decision on any basis
except safety. Absent interference with FDA regulation, there is no need for tort liability. In these distinct
roles, regulation and tort can each complement the decision-making of the other instead of overruling it. This
shared governance of drug safety promises greater eciency, less confusion, and ultimately more protection
for patients.
2There are currently two systems in the United States to ensure the safety of pharmaceutical products: tort
law and regulation. These separate systems have developed side by side, pursuing the same objective of safe
drugs for patients, with little communication and no cooperation between them. This separation has lead
to conicting decisions. The classic example is Bendectin, a drug for morning sickness that was driven o
the market by tort litigation despite the Food and Drug Administration (\FDA") concluding it was safe.11
A more recent example is Rezulin, the rst drug in a new chemical class for treating type II diabetes.22 FDA
approved Rezulin because its benets to diabetics outweighed its risk of liver damage. Three years later
FDA requested that it be withdrawn from the market, after two new drugs in the same chemical class were
shown to provide the same benets with less risk of liver damage. Despite FDA acknowledging the public
benets of Rezulin during its time on the market, the manufacturer has since been subject to an onslaught
of lawsuits claiming compensation for injuries caused by the drug.
The shared goal of tort law and FDA regulation is to make benecial drugs available to patients while keeping
unsafe drugs o the market. This goal will be better served if tort law and FDA regulation are combined
into a unied system, wherein each functions in the role best suited to its relative strengths and weaknesses.
A unied system will have a single standard for drug safety. This prevents redundant decision-making and
conicting decisions. A double standard can only lead to reduced protection for patients and increased
confusion for pharmaceutical manufacturers. In the proposed unied system FDA would be the decision
maker, setting the standard for drug safety, and tort would be the enforcer, safeguarding the process of FDA
regulation. FDA is the better institution for making scientic decisions on a society-wide basis. It has access
11 W. Kip Viscusi, et al., Deterring Inecient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale For the FDA Regulatory
Compliance Defense, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1437, 1473{75 (1994).
22 See discussion infra Part IV.
3to the highest levels of scientic expertise, and furthermore has a broad national perspective that allows it
to make rational risk-benet trade-os on a nation-wide basis. FDA should therefore decide which drugs are
safe to be on the market. Tort is the better institution for ensuring FDA has all available information about
a drug's safety and for restraining undue political inuence over FDA decision-making. The prospect of a
multi-million-dollar damage award provides a nancial incentive for law rms to invest heavily in discovering
exactly what a pharmaceutical manufacturer knew about a drug's safety and when it knew it. The tort
system is also designed to make the decision-makers immune to outside political inuence. Tort should
therefore hold pharmaceutical manufacturers liable if they withhold safety information from FDA or if they
attempt to force a decision on any basis except safety. Absent interference with FDA regulation, there is no
need for tort liability. In these distinct roles, regulation and tort can each complement the decision-making
of the other instead of overruling it. This shared governance of drug safety promises greater eciency, less
confusion, and ultimately more protection for patients.
I. The Current System of Dual Governance
I. The Current System of Dual Governance Tort law and FDA both seek to ensure the
safety of the nation's pharmaceuticals. FDA derives its authority as the nation's principal regulator of
pharmaceuticals from the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (\FD&C Act").33
Pursuant to its directive as a \public health protector," FDA employs a comprehensive scheme of pre-market
testing and post-market surveillance to ensure that all pharmaceutical products on the market are safe.44
33 21 U.S.C. x x 301-393 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
44 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. x 355(d) (1982) (authorizing the Secretary to deny licensing approval in the absence of adequate
evidence that the drug is \safe for use under the conditions prescribed").
4Prior to allowing a drug on the market, the manufacturer must conduct extensive clinical testing to ensure
that the potential benets of the pharmaceutical outweigh its associated risks.55
FDA's involvement begins with the submission of an Investigational New Drug application (\IND").66
The IND contains information about the proposed drug's chemistry, manufacturing, pharmacology, and
toxicology. If approved, the IND permits the drug's manufacturer to begin testing on animal and eventually
human subjects with the goal of submitting an application for marketing approval, a New Drug Application
(\NDA"). The NDA must include data from all animal studies and clinical testing done with the drug,
reports of any adverse reactions, and any other pertinent information from worldwide scientic literature.77
In addition to safety and ecacy data, the FD&C Act also requires the NDA to contain \specimens of the
labeling proposed to be used for such drug."88
The statutory labeling requirement serves two central functions.99
First, it provides the analytic framework under which the FDA makes a more rened evaluation of the
safety and ecacy of the medication. Second, if the drug satises this initial threshold, FDA oversight of
the medication's labeling ensures that information necessary to an informed medical decision concerning the
drug is conveyed as eectively as possible. Approval of the NDA allows the manufacturer to begin marketing
55 See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) (stating that the FDA \generally considers a drug safe
when the expected therapeutic gain justies the risk entailed by its use").
66 21 U.S.C. x 355(i) (1982). See generally David Kessler, The Regulation of Investigational Drugs, 320 New Eng. J. Med.
281 (1989) (discussing the regulatory process of pre-market FDA screening).
77 21 U.S.C. x 355(b)(1) (1982); 21 C.F.R. x 314.50 (1989).
88 21 U.S.C. x 355(b)(6) (1982).
99 Note: A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 773, 777
(1990).
5the drug. This approval reects FDA's risk-benet judgment that, on the whole, the drug will enhance
public health.1010
Given the inherent limitations of pre-market testing, FDA also conducts extensive post-marketing surveil-
lance. Manufacturers are required to monitor and follow up on adverse drug experiences reported by prac-
titioners and patients as well as on research studies.1111
The FD&C Act empowers FDA to enforce these reporting requirements. Any failure to comply may subject
a manufacturer to civil and criminal penalties.1212
As a result of post-market ndings, FDA may require labeling changes in order to meet the requirements of
section 352 of the FD&C Act,1313
or, if necessary, withdraw NDA approval and thereby revoke the license to market the drug.1414
In addition to extensive FDA regulation, drug safety is also overseen by the tort system. Numerous courts
have concluded that in enacting the FD&C Act, Congress evinced no intention to preempt state tort liability
for drug injuries. The Supreme Court of New Jersey found \nothing in the federal scheme to support
the assertion that manufacturers of prescription drugs and antibiotics who literally comply with [FDA
regulations] must be immune from state tort liability for injuries caused by their products."1515
1010 Viscusi, supra note, 1 at 1444.
1111 Robert Faich, Adverse Drug Experience Reporting and Product Liability, 41 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 444, 444 (1986)
(citing 21 C.F.R. x 314.80 (1985)).
1212 Prohibited acts are subject to injunction, 21 U.S.C. x 332 (1982); criminal penalties, id. x 333; and seizure, id. x 334(a).
1313 Id. x 352 (setting out the statutory specications of a \misbranded drug").
1414 Id. x 355(e)(3).
1515 Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 125 N.J. 117, 147 (1991).
6The Fourth Circuit held that federal law does not preempt imposition of Virginia's common law liabil-
ity for failure to warn, despite the fact that labeling, \once approved, cannot be changed without FDA
approval."1616
A plurality of the Supreme Court stated that negligence and strict liability claims for failure to warn about
risks of a medical device were not preempted by federal regulations.1717 Few courts are willing to relinquish
control over any aspect of tort law to a government agency.
The most common tort claim involving drug safety is failure to warn.1818
Companies are liable for failing to warn of risks of which they knew or should have known at the time that
the product was sold.1919
\[W]hen the drug manufacturer fails to give an adequate warning, the drug may be considered `defective' and
unreasonably dangerous, thereby subjecting the manufacturer to strict liability for resulting injuries."2020
Claims of manufacturing defects are rare.2121
FDA regulation ensures a high level of quality control in drug manufacturing. Claims of design defects are
1616 Abbot by Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir.1988).
1717 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
1818 Steven Garber, et al., Product liability and the economics of pharmaceuticals and medical devices 40
(1993); Donald E. Vinson & Alexander H. Slaughter, Products Liability: Pharmaceutical Drug Cases 122 (1988).
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability x 6 cmt. d (1998).
1919 Garber, supra note 18, at 40.
2020 Seley v. G. D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 836 (1981).
2121 Garber, supra note 18, at 39.
7similarly rare for drugs.2222
For most other types of products, a design defect exists if the risks outweigh the benets. However a drug
is only defective if its risks outweigh its benets for every class of patient.2323
Therefore a drug is not defective if it provides a net benet to one class of patient, even if it poses a serious
risk to other patients. This rule reects the view that, as long as a given drug is benecial for some group of
patients, it should be available to that group, albeit with adequate warnings.2424 Physicians must therefore
be relied upon to prescribe the appropriate drug for the appropriate patients. Furthermore, unlike power
saws and swimming pools, no reasonable alternative design is possible for a drug. Current pharmaceutical
technology is incapable of reducing a drug's adverse eects by rearranging the various carbon, oxygen, and
other atoms that make up the drug molecule. Any change in a drug's chemical structure creates a new drug,
with unique physiological eects that are impossible to predict accurately. Therefore, under the risk-benet
test, a drug is only defectively designed in the rare case where its overall risks outweigh its overall benets.
In practice, therefore, tort law ensures the safety of drugs on the market by submitting the drug's label to
review by a jury. The jury will then decide if the manufacturer should have provided more information to
physicians about the drug's safety. FDA approval is evidence that the pharmaceutical manufacturer met its
duty to warn, but it is not conclusive.2525
2222 Id.
2323 Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F.Supp. 573, 578 (W.D.La.), a'd, 864 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that the
drug Tegretol was not defective because it had utility for suerers of psychomotor and grand mal seizures who did not respond
to conventional anticonvulsants); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo.1986) (holding that defendant's drug was
nondefective because it was the drug of choice for at least one class of patients); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability x 6(c) (1998).
2424 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability x 6 RN to cmt. f (1998).
2525 Jerey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration Regulations and Products Liability: Strong Sword,
Weak Shield, 22 Tort & Ins. L.J. 194, 243 (1987) (concluding that compliance with FDA regulation provides \only modest
protection against the successful lawsuit"); Thomas Scarlett, The Relationship Among Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting, Drug
8As a result, tort law and FDA regulation can reach directly conicting results. Juries have found pharma-
ceutical manufacturers liable for inadequate warnings where the FDA mandated, verbatim, the warning at
issue.2626
Moreover, juries have held manufacturers liable for inadequate disclosure where the manufacturer's attempts
to warn against the very adverse eect at issue were expressly rejected by FDA on the ground that there
was no credible scientic basis for including it in the warning.2727
Tort law eectively grants juries de novo review of FDA decisions on drug labeling. However juries are
deciding drug safety in hindsight, and hindsight bias can lead jurors to overestimate a drug's known risks at
the time it was approved.2828
Independent review coupled with 20-20 hindsight place juries in the position of second-guessing the extensive
FDA regulation of warnings that accompany prescription drugs.2929
Tort law should complement FDA regulation instead of creating an inconsistent standard of conduct for
pharmaceutical manufacturers to attempt to follow. Tort law can do this by ensuring that FDA is able to
regulate properly. Pharmaceutical manufacturers should be held liable in tort for withholding drug safety
Labeling, Product Liability, and Federal Preemption, 46 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 31, 39 (1991) (compliance with government
standards merely a factor in liability determination).
2626 See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (N.H. 1981) (rejecting an argument that warnings
were adequate because they were drafted by FDA as required for uniform labeling of all oral contraceptives); McEwen v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 534 (Or. 1974) (holding the manufacturer liable for an inadequate warning even though
FDA wrote the warning and federal law required its inclusion).
2727 See, e.g., Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1057 (Kan. 1984); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,
479 A.2d 374, 378-79 (N.J. 1984).
2828 W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs Of Punitive Damages Against Corporations In Environmental And Safety Torts, 87
Geo. L.J. 285, 328 (1998).
2929 Viscusi, supra note 1, at 1467{68.
9information from FDA or for exerting undue political inuence over FDA's regulatory process. Absent
interference with the ability of FDA to regulate, pharmaceutical manufacturers should not be held liable in
tort. Compliance with FDA regulations should therefore be a complete defense to liability in tort. Tort law
should complement FDA's eorts by safeguarding the process of FDA regulation, not by second-guessing
the results arrived at by that process.
The dual systems of tort law and FDA regulation will inevitably run into conict if both attempt to ensure
drug safety by the same means. This conict creates inconsistent safety standards, which can only result
in confusion for pharmaceutical manufacturers and diminished protection for users of prescription drugs.
Instead, tort and FDA should function in distinct roles determined by their relative strengths.
II. Integrating Tort Law and FDA Regulation
II. Integrating Tort Law and FDA Regulation Tort law and federal regulation each have
distinct advantages in their shared goal of ensuring that only safe drugs are allowed onto the market. In their
shared goal of ensuring drug safety, tort and FDA should adopt complementary roles that take advantage
of their respective strengths, instead of cancelling each other out. FDA has greater scientic expertise and
the ability to make decisions on a nation-wide basis. FDA should therefore set the national standard for
drug safety. Tort law has greater resources and political independence. The tort system should therefore
safeguard the process of FDA regulation, by holding a pharmaceutical manufacturer liable for withholding
safety information from the FDA or attempting to force a regulatory decision on any basis except safety.
In these distinct roles, regulation and tort can each complement the decision-making of the other instead
10of overruling it. This will avoid the problems of the current system of dual governance with its overlapping
roles, inecient rule-making, and conicting standards of conduct for pharmaceutical manufacturers.
A. Advantages of Tort: Resources
A. Advantages of Tort: Resources The tort system can ensure compliance with FDA regulations,
because it has the resources that FDA lacks. Damage awards provide law rms with a nancial incentive
to conduct extensive investigations that FDA cannot aord. Damages in pharmaceutical products liability
litigation topped $100 million in 1985.3030
This creates a nancial incentive for law rms to invest in discovery of a pharmaceutical manufacturer's
records to establish what it knew about a drug's safety and when it knew it. A plainti's lawyer can esti-
mate the recovery from a client's claim, based on the amount of past damage awards and the probability
of success at trial. This is the same calculation that a pharmaceutical manufacturer does when making a
settlement oer. The lawyer will then be willing to invest in the claim up to the amount of the expected
contingency fee portion of that recovery. Entrepreneurial plaintis' lawyers therefore have a nancial in-
centive to invest many millions of dollars in factnding and discovery. For example, two separate law rms
representing dierent plaintis with fen-phen claims went through millions of documents from American
Home Product's warehouse of raw fen-phen data.3131
3030 W. Kip Viscusi et al., Statistical Prole of Pharmaceutical Industry Liability, 1976-1989, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1418,
1430 (1994).
3131 Alicia Munday, Dispensing with the Truth: The Victims, the Drug Companies, and the Dramatic Story
Behind the Battle over Fen-phen 152{53 (2001).
11By contrast, FDA is chronically short of resources to meet its statutory responsibilities.3232
In particular, FDA lacks the resources \to monitor manufacturer post-approval reporting behavior, detect
violations, impose adequate sanctions, and thereby provide an appropriate deterrent."3333. Instead of ac-
tively investigating a pharmaceutical manufacturer's records to determine whether it has told the full story
about a drug's safety, FDA is forced to rely on noticing inconsistencies in the data presented to it. The
threat of a thorough review of its records, should a drug be associated with a future injury, motivates phar-
maceutical manufacturers to provide complete safety information to FDA. Given that investigation is much
more resource-intensive than decision-making, tort is the better institution to ensure compliance with FDA
regulations
B. Advantages of Tort: Independence
B. Advantages of Tort: Independence FDA is subject to political pressure. Many injured patients
have alleged that Warner-Lambert exerted undue political inuence over FDA by successfully seeking the
removal of an FDA ocial critical of Rezulin's safety. Dr. John Gueriguian, a veteran FDA medical ocer
assigned to evaluate Rezulin, reviewed the NDA and after documenting its possible danger to the liver
recommended on October 9, 1996, that the agency reject the drug.3434
3232 See Advisory Committee On the Food and Drug Administration, Final Report 11 (1991) (\It is glaringly apparent that
the FDA cannot now execute all of its statutory responsibilities within the limitations of existing resources, a conclusion that is
repeated throughout this report."); Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction Needs
Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511, 530 (1988) (\Virtually all observers, including medical
device manufacturers, share the view that the FDA's resources are inadequate to meet its obligations under the Medical Device
Amendments.").
3333 Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform
461, 499 (1997).
3434 Class Actions, Wrongful Death Complaints Follow Withdrawal of Rezulin, Mealey's Emerging Drugs and Devices, Apr.
6, 2000, at 4.
12Warner-Lambert is alleged to have complained to one of Gueriguian's superiors, Dr. Murray Lumpkin,
deputy director of the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and shortly afterwards, on November
4, 1996, Gueriguian was removed by Dr. Solomon Sobel, chief of the FDA's diabetes drug division.3535
Dr. Gueriguian has subsequently accused Warner-Lambert of deliberately biasing study protocol in an
attempt to speed the drug through its approval process.3636
FDA is also subject to direct political pressure from Congress. While FDA reviewers were debating the NDA
for Redux, a weight-reduction drug, Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts wrote to FDA urging them to
approve the drug, which was made by a Boston company.3737
This sort of direct pressure can be particularly threatening since Congress decides the FDA budget annually.3838
Due to the huge prots at stake in the drug approval process, FDA is a target of political inuence. Only
a systemic solution can control this inuence. While a congressional committee will investigate blatant po-
litical pressure if it raises enough alarms on Capitol Hill, a systemic solution can address ongoing political
inuence on a daily basis. One possibility is for FDA to form an ad hoc committee or assign a separate
department to investigate allegations of political inuence over its regulation. Alternatively, these allegations
can be reviewed in a court of law.
A jury is the better institution to assess allegations of political inuence because it is politically independent.
3535 Id.
3636 Ex-FDA Reviewer Says Rezulin Maker Doctored Studies to Gain Approval, Mealey's Emerging Drugs and Devices, Apr.
16, 1999, at 25.
3737 Dispensing with the Truth, supra note 31, at 74.
3838 FDA Oce of Financial Management, About OFM (Apr. 11, 2001) at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/internet default.htm.
13Unlike an administrative agency, a jury can only be addressed in the limited forum of an open courtroom.
It is a violation of both criminal law3939
and American Bar Association rules4040 for a lawyer to have any contact with a juror outside of a courtroom.
A jury is therefore able to make an independent assessment of undue inuence over FDA's drug approval
process. By contrast, any internal FDA review would itself be subject to pressure to resolve the allegations
in favor of one side or the other. Furthermore, a jury has no stake in its own decision. A jury can freely
criticize the decision-making processes of the FDA because it has no stake in the FDA's political image. Any
separate department or committee of the FDA created to investigate political inuence would be reluctant
to nd undue political inuence if this would reect poorly on the agency's decision-making or on familiar
individuals within the agency.
C. Advantages of Tort: Deciding Standards of Conduct
C. Advantages of Tort: Deciding Standards of Conduct A jury is the better institution to decide the
acceptable level of political inuence over FDA. The issue of undue political inuence is not a
technical one amenable to regulation. No special expertise is necessary to decide whether pres-
sure to remove a particular reviewer was beyond the acceptable bounds of behavior. Political
inuence is an issue of standard of conduct, that is, of whether a pharmaceutical manufacturer
exceeded acceptable standards of political behavior in its attempt to inuence FDA regulation.
Juries have traditionally measured individual behavior against a socially accepted standard of
conduct, the classic example being a criminal trial. Allowing juries to decide whether FDA
3939 See, e.g., United States v. Forrest, 623 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1979).
4040 Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct x 3.5 (1999).
14was subject to undue political inuence would allow ordinary citizens to determine on a case-
by-case basis the extent of acceptable inuence over an agency that regulates the basics of life.
Allowing undue political inuence to be decided by a jury does not imply that juries will also
review FDA policy. A jury is only empowered to decide the issue before it, which would be a
single case of alleged political inuence resulting in injury caused by an identiable defendant.
Juries would not be empowered to review broad FDA policies, such as a campaign by AIDS
activists that led to accelerated review for certain new AIDS drugs.4141 Jury decisions would be
limited to judging a single act of political inuence by a pharmaceutical manufacturer in an attempt to
inuence approval of a new drug.
D. Advantages of Regulation: Scientic Expertise
D. Advantages of Regulation: Scientic Expertise FDA's scientic expertise makes it the better
institution to evaluate a drug's safety. FDA employs a large number of scientists and medical doctors,
and can also form advisory committees to gain access to the highest levels of scholarship on any scientic
issue.4242
By contrast, the average juror has a high school education and must be educated about scientically complex
issues in the course of a trial lasting a few weeks. Jury verdicts imposing tort liability in cases involving
Bendectin, breast implants, and vaccines have been directly contrary to the overwhelming consensus of
knowledgeable independent scientists regarding these products' potential to cause harm.4343
4141 FDA's Fast-track Approval Process Blamed for `Seven Deadly Drugs,' Medico-Legal Watch, Feb. 2001, at 146.
4242 Use of Advisory Committees by the Food and Drug Administrative: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Government Operation, 93d Congress, 2d Session (1974) (statement of FDA Commissioner Alexander M. Schmidt).
4343 Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 Geo. L.J.
15\Because the typical juror does not possess the scientic expertise to evaluate the validity of the substantive
scientic evidence at issue, however, resolution necessarily becomes merely an analysis of the credibility
and demeanor of competing expert witnesses, and may often yield outcomes in conict with generally ac-
cepted scientic understandings."4444 Juries are competent to assess credibility but not scientic evidence.
Accordingly, FDA is the better institution to decide if a drug is safe to be on the market.
In addition to its expertise, FDA has a better decision-making structure for resolving issues of drug safety.
Following submission of an NDA, FDA can initiate further investigation of a particular aspect of a drug's
safety by requesting more studies from the pharmaceutical manufacturer. FDA is not hesitant to require
further information before it approves an NDA.4545
A jury, by contrast, is passively limited to the safety information presented to it by the two sides at trial.
FDA is also able to modify its decision-making structure and adapt to new experience. For example, following
concerns about a clinical bias on the part of the advisory committee that reviewed Rezulin, FDA resolved
to eliminate this bias by adding epidemiological experts to future advisory committees.4646
Juries have traditionally been limited since the ratication of the Constitution to six or twelve citizens chosen
at random from the local population. Commentators have argued for decades that the jury structure should
be changed to better address scientic issues, but there has been no systemic change to the traditional
jury structure.4747 FDA's decision-making structure coupled with its scientic expertise makes it the better
2167, 2171 (2000).
4444 A Question of Competence: the Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 773, 781 (1990).
4545 Michael Kimball, FDA To Hasten Approval, HEALTH WEEK, Nov. 9, 1987 (\A study of 637 NDAs received since 1981
found that the FDA returned two-thirds to the sponsor with requests for more information.").
4646 US FDA Rezulin withdrawal study sees communication, other problems, at CDER, MKLTR, Nov. 27, 2000, at 1.
4747 See, e.g., Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientic Misconceptions among Daubert Gatekeepers: the Need for Reform of
Expert Review Procedures, 64 Law and Contemp. Probs. 327, 365 (2001).
16institution to resolve issues of drug safety, provided it has complete information on a drug's safety.
E. Advantages of Regulation: Broad Perspective
E. Advantages of Regulation: Broad Perspective FDA's broad regulatory perspective make it the better
institution to decide scientic issues on a society-wide basis. In addition to advisory committees and a sta
of scientists, FDA's society-wide outlook better enables it to decide whether a drug is safe for marketing.
Most jurisdictions hold that a drug should be available to the public if its benets outweigh its risks for at
least one class of patients.4848
FDA is better able to weigh the risks and benets of a drug because it considers the drug in the context
of the entire national population instead of focusing on a single victim. For example, FDA decided to keep
Rezulin on the market despite 3 deaths associates with the drug because its life-saving benets to 500,000
type II diabetes patients outweighed the small risk of harm.4949
A jury may have assessed sucient damages against Warner-Lambert to force the drug o the market. While
FDA may or may not have made the right decision to keep Rezulin on the market, the important point is that
it made the decision in the right way. Juries make decisions case by case, in an isolated and uncoordinated
fashion. They are not institutionally equipped to make the risk-risk tradeos and benet-benet tradeos
required for risk regulation.5050
4848 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability x 2 cmt. a (1998).
4949 FDA talk paper, Patient Testing and Labeling Strengthened for Rezulin (December 1, 1997) available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00837.html.
5050 Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-
Track System, 88 Geo. L.J. 2167, 2173 (2000).
17A jury is typically confronted with a single victim and asked to decide whether the drug should have been
available to the entire population. This is the wrong context in which to make social policy, because a jury is
faced with a concrete example of the risks of a drug without comparable evidence of its benets. Furthermore
a jury's judgment will be blinded by natural sympathy for the victim. It is dicult to rationally weigh the
benets of a drug to millions of diabetics when confronted with the case of a man who has died following
a liver transplant. Finally a jury would be deciding social policy in hindsight, and hindsight bias can lead
jurors to overestimate a drug's known risks at the time it was approved.5151 Juries are not institutionally
equipped to decide whether the risks of a drug outweigh its benets for the entire national population. This
is a decision best made by FDA, which has both the expertise and the proper perspective to make it.
F. Merging Regulation and Tort into a Unied System of Governance
F. Merging Regulation and Tort into a Unied System of Governance Regulation and tort
can function in distinct roles within a unied system to ensure the safety of drugs on the market. Tort
law provides resources and the incentive to dig into a pharmaceutical manufacturer's records to ensure it
has provided all relevant safety data to FDA. The tort system also has the independence to fairly assess
undue political inuence over FDA, and is the better institution to set the standard for acceptable political
inuence. FDA has access to the highest levels of scientic expertise for evaluating drug safety. Its broad
outlook also enables it to make safety decisions on a society-wide basis, instead of assessing liability for
individual injuries without any overall plan. The strengths and weakness of regulation and tort suggest
distinct roles for each in a unied system. Instead of acting like two kings striving to rule the same territory,
regulation and tort should share responsibility for drug safety. FDA is the better institution for making
5151 Viscusi, supra note 28, at 328.
18scientic decisions on a society-wide basis. FDA should therefore decide which drugs are safe to be on
the market. Tort is the better institution for ensuring FDA has all available information about a drug's
safety and for restraining undue political inuence over FDA decision-making. Tort should therefore hold
pharmaceutical manufacturers liable only if they withhold safety information from FDA or if they attempt
to inuence approval of a drug by political means. In these distinct roles, regulation and tort can each
complement the decision-making of the other instead of overruling it. This shared governance of drug safety
promises to be a more ecient and more consistent means of ensuring drug safety for patients.
III. Criticism of a Unied System
III. Criticism of a Unied System Commentators have argued forth for decades about whether
FDA or tort should have the nal responsibility for drug safety, but there has been little discussion of a
unied system that combines the strengths and weakness of each.5252 In the context of this ongoing debate,
however, arguments have been raised that could be critical of the proposed unied system.
A. Criticism: The Role of Tort Law Is to Compensate Injured Patients
A. Criticism: The Role of Tort Law Is to Compensate Injured Patients Some authors have argued
that tort law is essential to provide compensation to the victims of drug injuries. In this view,
5252 Compare Viscusi, supra note 1, at 1475{79 (advocating a regulatory compliance defense in which tort law would defer to
FDA regulation), with Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. Mich.
J.L. Ref. 461, 507{10 (1997) (arguing that tort law deference to FDA regulation is problematic and ultimately unhelpful).
19the purpose of tort law is to compensate the injured at the expense of the wrong-doer by
awarding compensatory damages.5353
Tort law \is directed toward the compensation of individuals ... for losses they have suered within
the scope of their legally recognized interests."5454
In the context of pharmaceutical products, Professor Robert Rabin has argued that tort law has \a legitimate
interest in ensuring compensation to its citizens in accidental harm situations."5555
Similarly, Professor Richard Merrill has suggested that pharmaceutical manufacturers be held strictly liable
for all injuries that are not the result of a physician's negligence.5656
In contrast, other authorities have argued that the primary purpose of tort law is to prevent injury, not to
compensate the victims. The Restatement (Third) on Torts has premised tort law liability for pharmaceutical
products on the \instrumental function of creating safety incentives."5757
Professor David Rosenberg has argued that individuals would rationally prefer a legal system \that allocates
enforcement resources to prevent unreasonable risk rather than merely to compensate it."5858
Reducing the total amount of injury increases social welfare, thereby increasing each individual's share of
5353 Id. x 2, at 7.
5454 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts x 1, at 5-6 (1984).
5555 Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 Geo. L.J. 2049, 2073.
5656 Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 Va. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1973).
5757 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability x 2 cmt. a (1998).
5858 David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831,
840 (2002).
20the pie.5959 Accordingly, the tort system should only compensate victims for unreasonable injuries and not
for all injuries.
The issue of compensation ultimately turns on the perceived role of tort law. One side argues that the
role of tort is to prevent future injuries, while the other side maintains it is to provide compensation for
past injuries. If the role of tort is to prevent future injuries, then a pharmaceutical manufacturer would
only pay compensation for injuries caused by unreasonably dangerous drugs. In this view there would be
no compensation once a drug received FDA approval, because FDA's judgment as to drug safety trumps
that of a lay jury. The duty of a pharmaceutical manufacturer would therefore be limited to producing
safe drugs. If instead the role of tort is to provide compensation for past injuries, then a pharmaceutical
manufacturer would pay compensation every time a patient was harmed by its drug. In this view there would
be compensation following FDA approval. The pharmaceutical manufacturer would therefore be required to
pay for every injury caused by a drug, regardless of whether FDA found the drug to be safe or not. This
decision is too important to be decided by juries on a case-by-case basis. Given its broad impact on health
care and the structure of the pharmaceutical industry, this decision should instead be made by a legislature.
If pharmaceutical manufacturers are required to compensate all victims of drug injuries, they will eectively
be forced into the business of health insurance. Instead of simply being required to market safe drugs, tort
law will also hold them responsible for paying the medical bills of injured patients as well as compensation
for their pain and suering. This is in stark contrast to the deterrent role of tort, which seeks to ensure
drug safety but does not place responsibility for health care on pharmaceutical manufacturers. While tort
can certainly be used as a source of compensation for drug injuries, this does not mean that pharmaceutical
5959 Id. at 843.
21manufacturers should be the insurers of their drugs absent an express mandate from a legislature.
B. Criticism: Tort Sets a Higher Standard for Drug Safety than Regulation
B. Criticism: Tort Sets a Higher Standard for Drug Safety than Regulation Regulation has
been described as setting only a minimum standard for safety, with tort law setting a higher standard above
this oor. Professor Robert Rabin has argued that there is reason to treat compliance with FDA regulation
as a \safe harbor" for a defendant whose product is alleged to be defective.6060
Tort therefore sets its own safety standard independent of regulation The Restatement (Third) of Torts con-
rms that product safety statutes and regulations are generally taken to be minimum standards. Regulations
set a \oor of safety below which product sellers fall only at their peril, but they leave open the question of
whether a higher standard of product safety should be applied."6161
This argument has been borne out in the courts. For example, in McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
the Oregon Supreme Court scrutinized the manufacturer's FDA-approved warning labels and held that the
warnings may be found inadequate even though all governmental regulations had been satisfactorily met.6262
The court noted that the federal agency's approval represented compliance that was \minimal in nature."6363
FDA regulation of drug safety is dierent from regulation of other products by other agencies. FDA regula-
6060 Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 Geo. L.J. 2049, 2051 (2000).
6161 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability x 4 cmt. e (1998).
6262 528 P.2d 522 (Or. 1974).
6363 Id. at 534.
22tions allow a drug to be approved for marketing only if tests show it to be \safe".6464
There is no mention of minimal safety. This is in contrast to FAA regulations, which explicitly prescribe
only \minimum standards".6565
Furthermore FDA ocials do not see themselves as setting minimum standards for safety, but optimal
standards.6666
Their goal is to keep all unsafe drugs o the market, not merely the very unsafe. Finally \minimally safe"
is a meaningless term that has never been dened in the context of prescription drugs. In the context of
other consumer products, \minimally safe" has been interpreted to mean that the product will not cause
injury \when used in the customary, usual, and reasonably foreseeable manners."6767 The terms \minimally
safe" and \safe" can therefore be used to distinguish between foreseeable and unforeseeable use of a product.
However there is only one use for prescription drugs. The warning label on a drug species the safe dosage
that a physician can prescribe, and a patient is expected to use the drug only as prescribed. A pharmaceutical
manufacturer is not liable for o-label use by physicians or for overdose by a patient. Since there is only
a single accepted use for a drug, there is no application for the term \minimally safe" in the context of
pharmaceutical products. It is unrealistic and meaningless to conclude that FDA sets minimal standards for
drug safety.
6464 21 U.S.C. x 355(d)(2) (1982) (requiring FDA to reject an NDA if \the results of such tests show that such drug is unsafe
for use under such conditions or do not show that such drug is safe for use under such conditions").
6565 49 U.S.C. x 44701 (\(a) The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe ight of civil
aircraft in air commerce by prescribing (1) minimum standards required in the interest of safety for appliances and for the
design, material, construction, quality of work, and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers.").
6666 Interview with Peter B. Hutt, FDA Chief Counsel (1971{75), in Cambridge, Mass. (Jan. 22, 2002).
6767 Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 258{59 (1995).
23C. Criticism: Juries Are Incompetent to Decide Complicated Issues
C. Criticism: Juries Are Incompetent to Decide Complicated Issues Some authors have argued
that tort deference to FDA decisions is infeasible because juries are incapable of determining whether a
pharmaceutical manufacturer has actually complied with FDA regulations. Professor Michael Green argues
that juries will be unable to determine whether a pharmaceutical manufacturer has complied with FDA
regulations.6868
FDA regulations are very complicated. While FDA itself might indicate when a pharmaceutical manufacturer
has violated its regulations, the agency will rarely indicate when a manufacturer has complied. Professor
Lars Noah has suggested that as a result of this complexity, regulation should preempt tort law only in
those situations in which a regulatory infraction is apparent, as when the agency undertakes an enforcement
action.6969
As a preliminary matter, juries already make these complicated determinations, wholly apart from any
regulatory compliance defense. In defense to a failure to warn claim, pharmaceutical manufacturers typically
argue that they have complied with FDA regulations. They present evidence of data provided to FDA and
FDA's response. This evidence is strong support for a manufacturer's argument that it was not negligent
in warning physicians about all of a drug's known risks. So juries already decide the issue of regulatory
compliance. A regulatory compliance defense would change the eect of their decision, but not the fact
of their making it. Without the defense, a nding of compliance is strong support for a pharmaceutical
manufacturer's defense. With the defense, this nding would be a complete defense to liability. In addition,
6868 Michael D. Green, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 Geo. L.J. 2119, 2140{41 (2000).
6969 Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the Government Standards Defense, 37 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 903, 954{57 (1996).
24this determination is not overly complicated. In practical terms, a typical failure to warn claim will involve
a piece of data withheld from FDA and the allegation that withholding the information caused a plainti's
injury. A jury is therefore required to decide whether the data was material to the drug's safety or not.
Details of the exact date by which the data should have been provided, the sort of complication that Professor
Green hints at, might well be argued over but are likely to have little inuence on the jury's decision. If a
jury decides that the data was important enough for FDA to know about, regulatory ne print and loopholes
will not save the pharmaceutical manufacturer that withheld it.
More broadly, holding pharmaceutical manufacturers liable for withholding safety information from FDA is
not the same as creating a regulatory compliance defense. A jury's role in the proposed unied system is to
determine whether a pharmaceutical manufacturer has interfered with the process of FDA regulation. It is
irrelevant whether FDA would have approved a drug despite a manufacturer withholding information about
the drug's safety.7070 The issue is not what FDA's decision would have been, but whether a manufacturer
withheld information or not. The proposal is that withholding information from FDA would return a
pharmaceutical manufacturer to the traditional tort system. Compliance would no longer be any defense
to liability. This is consistent with the argument that if FDA has all available information about a drug's
safety, there is no need for a jury to assess tort liability. FDA is the better institution to ensure the safety
of drugs on the market, provided it has complete information. However if a pharmaceutical manufacturer
withholds information then FDA is unable to function properly in its role, and tort liability then becomes
the appropriate institution for assessing liability.
7070 cf. Michael v. Shiley, 46 F.3d 1316, 1328{29 (3d Cir. 1995) (interpreting regulatory compliance defense to require
determination of whether FDA would have approved medical device despite manufacturer's misrepresentations).
25IV. The History of Rezulin
IV. The History of Rezulin Rezulin, a diabetes drug, was withdrawn from the market three
years after receiving FDA approval. The history of Rezulin is an example of the interaction between FDA
regulation and the tort system. It can thus serve as a demonstration of the current system of dual governance
for ensuring drug safety, as well as an illustration of how the proposed unied system of governance might
work in practice.
On December 11, 1996 the FDA's Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Committee unanimously
recommended approval of Rezulin to treat type II diabetes poorly controlled by insulin.7171
Rezulin allowed certain diabetes to reduce or eliminate their dependence on insulin. Diabetes aects about
16 million Americans and can cause damage to the eyes, kidneys, heart and peripheral circulation. Type II
diabetes, non-insulin dependent diabetes, aects nearly 90 percent of all diabetics in the United States. It
usually starts in adulthood and is commonly associated with being overweight. Approximately three million
type II diabetics require regular insulin injections. Rezulin was expected to help the approximately one
million patients with type II diabetes who do not respond adequately to insulin. The new drug was the rst
in its chemical class. In clinical trials involving about 500 patients, Rezulin was shown to signicantly improve
patients' ability to use insulin in managing their diabetes. In general, Rezulin was well tolerated. Commonly
reported adverse events included infection, pain and headache, but these occurred at rates comparable to
placebo. Approximately two percent of all patients in the trials were found to have elevated liver enzymes in
the blood. These elevations, which serve as markers of potential liver injury, were mostly mild, unassociated
7171 FDA Talk Paper, FDA Approves Rezulin for Diabetes Patients Poorly Controlled on Insulin Therapy (January 30, 1997)
at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00783.html.
26with symptoms, and usually resolved when the drug was discontinued.7272 On the basis of these studies,
FDA recommended caution in prescribing Rezulin for patients with liver disease.
FDA ocially approved Rezulin in January 1997, making it the most quickly endorsed diabetes pill in the
agency's 60-year history.7373
The six months it took to make the decision was less than half the normal approval time. During this approval
process, Dr. John Gueriguian, a veteran FDA medical ocer assigned to evaluate Rezulin, reviewed the NDA
and after documenting its possible danger to the liver recommended on October 9, 1996, that the agency
reject the drug.7474
On November 4, 1996, Gueriguian was removed by Dr. Solomon Sobel, chief of the FDA's diabetes drug
division.7575
On October 28, 1997 Parke Davis, the manufacturer of Rezulin, sent a letter to physicians advising of 35
post-marketing reports of liver injury associated with Rezulin.7676
These reports ranged from mildly elevated liver enzymes in the blood to liver failure leading to one liver
transplant and one death. At the time of the letter, about 500,000 diabetics in the United States had been
treated with Rezulin. Of those, approximately 85,000 had been taking the drug for six months or more.
7272 FDA Talk Paper, Patient Testing and Labeling Strengthened for Rezulin (December 1, 1997) at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00837.html.
7373 Robert K. Jenner, Rezulin: Fast Track to Failure, Trial, July 2000, at 39.
7474 Class Actions, Wrongful Death Complaints Follow Withdrawal of Rezulin, Mealey's Emerging Drugs and Devices, Apr.
6, 2000, at 4.
7575 Id.
7676 Letter from Parke Davis to healthcare professionals (Oct. 28, 1997) at
http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/safety/1997/rezuli.htm.
27FDA found it unclear whether Rezulin was solely responsible for these reported injuries, or whether they
were due to other medical factors.7777
Based on these reports, FDA recommended that liver enzyme levels be monitored during Rezulin therapy and
that liver function tests be obtained for patients with any symptom of liver damage. FDA also recommended
a new label warning. FDA did not suggest that the risks of Rezulin outweighed it benets, and there was
no mention of market withdrawal.7878
By December 1, 1997 FDA had received approximately 150 reports of injury linked to Rezulin, including
three deaths from liver failure in Japan.7979
These deaths occurred in patients treated before the stronger label warning and recommendation for liver
enzyme testing took eect there. FDA recommended more frequent monitoring of liver function. The agency
explicitly found that the benets of Rezulin continued to outweigh the risks for certain diabetics.8080
Parke Davis sent letters to physicians on December 1, 1997 and again on July 27, 1998 recommending more
frequent monitoring of liver function.8181
On July 27, 1998 Public Citizen, a non-prot health watchdog, petitioned FDA to withdraw Rezulin from
the United States market.8282
7777 FDA Talk Paper, Rezulin Labeling Changes (Nov. 3, 1997) at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00831.html.
7878 Id.
7979 FDA Talk Paper, Patient Testing and Labeling Strengthened for Rezulin (Dec. 1, 1997) at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS00837.html.
8080 Id.
8181 Letter from Parke Davis to healthcare professionals (Dec. 1, 1997) at
http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/safety/1997/rezul3.htm.
8282 Public Citizen's Health Research Group, Petition to the Food and Drug Administration to ban troglitazone/Rezulin due
28Public Citizen noted that the FDA had received 560 injury reports associated with Rezulin, including 21
deaths from liver failure and three patients requiring liver transplants. It estimated that only about one in
ten injuries were reported, and argued that the actual number of deaths could be as high as 200. Public
Citizen's petition was opposed by certain physicians, who argued that its estimate of under-reporting was
exaggerated and that the benets of Rezulin outweighed its risks since 150,000 diabetics die each year from
the disease.8383
Ultimately, on May 26, 1999 FDA declined to withdraw Rezulin from the market.8484
Instead, it recommended that Rezulin continue to be available to diabetics who did not respond well to
other diabetes drugs. The FDA found that with careful monitoring, the benets of Rezulin outweighed its
risks. The American Diabetes Association agreed that the benets of Rezulin signicantly outweighed its
risks, noting that almost all deaths associated with Rezulin took place before monitoring of liver function
was required.8585
On March 21, 2000 the FDA asked Parke Davis to remove Rezulin from the market.8686 FDA review of
recent safety data on Rezulin and two similar drugs, Avandia and Actos, showed that Rezulin was more
liver toxic than the other two drugs. Avandia and Actos, both approved in the past year, oered the same
benets as Rezulin but at less risk of liver damage. In light of these two new drugs for treating type II
to its causing several cases of liver failure (July 27, 1998) at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6647.
8383 Letter from Leann Olansky, M.D., to FDA (Mar. 1, 1999) at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/032299/c0005.pdf;
Letter from Kathleen A. Alm, M.D. to FDA (Feb. 22, 1999) at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/032599/C00010.PDF;
Letter from Lawrence D. Kelley, M.D., to FDA (Mar. 8, 1999) at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/032299/c0007.pdf.
8484 Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research at FDA, to Sidney Wolfe, Director,
Public Citizen's Health Research Group (May 26, 1999) at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/061499/pdn0001.pdf.
8585 W-L \Disappointed" By Media Reports On Rezulin, Marketletter, Dec.14, 1998.
8686 HHS News, Rezulin to Be Withdrawn from the Market (Mar. 21, 2000) at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00721.html.
29diabetes, FDA decided that the benets of Rezulin no longer outweighed its risks.
Following withdrawal of Rezulin, dozens of class actions and individual complaints were led in courts across
the country alleging that the drug had caused serious liver damage and deaths.8787
The complaints seek compensation for medical expenses, injury, non-economic damages, and medical moni-
toring. The rst nationwide federal class-action lawsuit was led in the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey.8888
Class representative Marilyn Appel accused the manufacturer of engaging in \calculated silence" despite
knowing of the growing public misconception regarding the drug's safety.8989 Common to all the lawsuits
led were claims that the manufacturer pushed to have Rezulin placed on the fast track for FDA approval,
despite questions about the drug's side eects. Plaintis also alleged that the company successfully sought
removal of an FDA ocial who was critical of Rezulin's safety.
V. Which Issues Should a Jury Decide?
V. Which Issues Should a Jury Decide? On December 17, 2001, in the rst Rezulin case to
make it to trial, a state court jury in Houston took eight hours to reject the claims of two women who alleged
that Rezulin caused their mother's fatal liver failure.9090 The jury eectively reviewed FDA's approval and
warning recommendations, nding that the drug was not defectively designed and that the manufacturer
8787 Warner-Lambert Faces Rash of Lawsuits on Heels of Rezulin Recall, 3 ANDDLR 10, 10 (June 2000).
8888 Class Actions, Wrongful Death Complaints Follow Withdrawal of Rezulin, Mealey's Emerging Drugs and Devices, Apr.
6, 2000, at 4.
8989 Id.
9090 Texas Jury Rejects $25 Million Rezulin Claim, Drug Recall LR, Jan. 2001, at 1.
30had provided adequate warning to physicians. This was not an ecient use of tort resources because, as
discussed earlier, a jury is not adequately equipped to decide issues of drug safety. Instead, the jury should
have decided two distinct issues. First, did the manufacturer provide complete safety information to FDA?
If Parke Davis provided all of its safety data on Rezulin to FDA, then FDA was able to make an informed
decision about whether to grant marketing approval. In this case, the threat of tort liability would not
provide any additional protection to diabetics. Instead tort would provide at best a redundant process,
and at worst an inconsistent decision that would only serve to needlessly punish Parke Davis for marketing
a safe drug. However if Parke Davis did withhold safety information from FDA then its approval would
be uninformed and therefore irrelevant. In this case, the manufacturer should be subject to ordinary tort
liability. The second issue for the jury is whether the manufacturer exerted undue political inuence over
FDA's decision to approve Rezulin. If Parke Davis did successfully push for the removal of Dr. Guerigian
then it should be subject to liability, because FDA's decision would be based on politics and not on an
objective evaluation of the drug's safety. However if a jury found that Dr. Sobel had sound reasons for
removing Guerigian then FDA approval should not be reviewed by a jury.
VI. Conclusion
VI. Conclusion The current dual system of governance for drug safety will inevitably result in
tort and FDA arriving at conicting decisions. This conict is inecient and creates inconsistent safety
standards, which can only result in confusion for pharmaceutical manufacturers and diminished protection
for users of prescription drugs. Instead, tort and FDA should function in complementary roles determined
by their relative strengths. FDA has scientic expertise and a broad regulatory perspective that make it the
better institution to evaluate drug safety. Tort has much greater resources and political independence that
31make it the better institution to decide whether FDA decisions were based on complete safety information.
Tort can thus safeguard the process of FDA decision-making. This unied system of governance eliminates
inconsistent standards of drug safety and promotes more ecient use of resources for the protection of
patients.
32